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Researchers in the safety field are facing more challenges everyday with the 
expanding modern socio-technical systems. Safety analysis such as hazard analysis, 
accident causation analysis, and risk assessment are being revisited to overcome the 
shortcoming of the conventional safety analysis. With increasingly complex human 
system interaction in today’s modern systems, new safety challenges are being faced that 
needed to be assessed and addressed. Managers and engineers face the challenge to 
choose from the vast amount of techniques available and utilize the correct one. Indeed, 
new or improved risk assessment tools that can address these complexities are needed. 
 One of the most important steps in assessing risk is first to categorize it. There 
are risks associated with product component failure, human error, operational failure, 
environmental disasters, etc. So far, however, there has been little discussion about how 
do managers choose between the available risk assessments tools, which this considered 
the first step in risk analysis. In this research, risk assessment tools have been 
investigated, analyzed, categorized, and then applied to case studies in different 
industries. A pathway for researchers has been paved to overcome the difficulties in 
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 It is amazing how our world is advancing everyday with more technologies and 
inventions. The advancement in technologies merged with different industries.  For 
example, the medical field utilizes nano technology to perform complex procedures.  The 
communication had its share of success where the Internet bridged the gap as information 
is transferred in fractions of a second from one location to another.  Software became 
more complex in solving mathematical models, and it is used in sophisticated 
manufacturing processes as well.  In fact, these technologies became more interrelated to 
introduce new products and services to mankind. However, such progress introduced new 
types of challenges due to the complexity of both organizations and processes.  As a 
result, new types of risks need to be identified.  Risk is “a characteristic of a situation or 
action wherein two or more outcomes are possible, the particular outcome that will occur 
is unknown, and at least one of the possibilities is undesired” (Covello and Merkhofer, 
1993). The technologies with its advancement have become so complex that these new 
risks need new risk assessment tools.  
 “Risk assessment is the process of identification, evaluation, acceptance, aversion, 
and management of risk” (Eccleston, 2011).  Researchers faced the challenge to develop 
new risk assessment techniques to overcome the shortage in the conventional ones 
available.  Managers and engineers face the challenge to choose from the vast amount of 
techniques available and utilize the correct one.  One of the most important steps in 
assessing risk is first to categorize it.  There are risks associated with product component 





there has been little discussion about how do managers choose between the available risk 
assessments tools, which this considered the first step in risk analysis.  One of the most 
significant questions that will arise when assessing risk is, which tool should be used in 
this scenario? In this research, risk assessment tools have been investigated, analyzed, 
categorized and then applied to case studies in the aviation and oil and gas industry.  A 
pathway for researchers has been paved to overcome the difficulties in choosing risk 
assessment tools.   
 The overall structure of the dissertation takes the form of six sections, including 
this introductory section.  Section two begins by a conference paper that was presented 
and published at the Annual International Conference of the American Society for 
Engineering Management 2011, “Applying the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident 
Causation.” The paper introduces the Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation, which 
was developed by James Reason, explores it, and applies it to two case studied to test its 
applicability and validity.  The third section is a journal article that was published in the 
Engineering Management Journal Special Issue –Risk Analysis June 2013, “Variations in 
Risk Management Models: A Comparative Study of the Space Shuttle Challenger 
Disaster.” The article is addresses more risk assessment tools such as Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Risk in Early Design (RED), 
Layer of Protection analysis (LOPA), and Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation. 
 It identifies the advantages, limitations and applicability of each tool and utilizes 
the Space Shuttle Challenger as a case study.  Section four presents a journal article that 
was submitted and is under review in the Journal of Loss Prevention in Process 





The article introduces a relatively new risk assessment model that has not been evaluated 
in the literature.  Moreover, the article identifies the advantages and disadvantages of the 
model and applies it to a case study in the oil and gas industry to validate its applicability. 
 Section five is an article that won first place in the 2012 Student Safety 
Innovation Challenge for the American Society of Mechanical Engineer’s Safety 
Engineering and Risk Analysis Division (SERAD), “Toward	   Quantifying	   the	   Safety	  Cognition	  in	  the	  Undergraduate	  Engineering	  Student.”	  	  This	  article	  analyzes	  a	  survey	  that	  conducted	  to	  measure	  the	  Safety	  knowledge	  and	  attitude	  of	  young	  engineering	  students	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  improve	  safety	  and	  prevent	  accidents	  in	  labs	  and	  workshops.	  	  Finally,	   in	  section	  six,	   the	  conclusion	  provides	  a	  brief	  summary	  and	  critique	  of	   the	  findings.	  	  	   
 


























 This paper shows how utilizing the Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation can 
aid engineering managers in understanding how errors might occur and how they can be 
prevented.  Human error is an issue of concern for every system.  Engineering managers 
need a structured approach to identify system gaps that fail to address potential human 
errors.  The model considers different levels of human error including unsafe acts, 
preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences. 
 Examples of past incidents including the Space Shuttle Challenger and the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill that resulted in catastrophic outcomes will be analyzed using the Swiss 
Cheese Model to identify potential hazards, safeguards, and shortcomings that resulted in 







The Swiss Cheese Model has been used for different types of accidents; it has 
most commonly been adopted in health care and aviation safety.  In this paper we will 
compare how each of these industries define their perspectives of the Swiss Cheese 
Model.  Furthermore, we will explore a new model for industrial application from an 
engineering management perspective.  First we will define the model and proceed with 
examples from aviation and health care.  Then we will introduce the new sequenced 
defensive layers for our examples the Space Shuttle Challenger and the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill incidents. The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster demonstrated a valuable example of 
human error and incorrect decision-making at an organizational level.  The Exxon Valdez 
oil spill incident shows different prospective of error causation, where all levels of the 
organization contributed to the incident, including the crewmembers in direct contact 
with the system. 
 
Background 
 The Swiss Cheese Model was developed by James Reason to address accidents in 
complex systems where many components interact with each other.  Reason  (2008), 
presented multiple human error accident examples in aviation systems, which include 
component aircrafts, runways, control towers, communication tools and equipment, 
luggage transport and handling systems.  These components interact with each other to 
form a complex system, which function as a whole.  Moreover, each component works 
independently by rules and policies set as a single system and interacts with other 





policies.  Considering the variety of components, policies, rules and environments, these 
systems are complex, which makes it harder for analysts to assess risk mitigation, human 
potential error, and accident prevention.  Many of the current risk assessment tools do not 
go far enough.  Some of them only identify technical aspects of the adverse event, 
pointing the finger toward the operator’s actions without tracing back to the origin of the 
accident and its circumstances. 
 The Swiss Cheese Model was proposed to overcome such dilemma by introducing 
a model that tracks accident causation in different levels of the organization without 
blaming individuals.  “We cannot change the human condition, we can change the 
conditions under which humans work” (Reason, 2000). 
 James Reason presented his model as stacked slices of Swiss cheese, where the 
slices represent the defenses and safeguards of the system and the holes represent active 
failures (i.e. unsafe acts) and latent conditions.  Unsafe acts occur when a human is in 
direct contact with the system such as during the Chernobyl accident where the operator 
wrongly violated the plant procedures and switched off successive safety system.  On the 
other hand, latent condition can occur at any level of the organization or any system and it 
is harder to detect such as lack of training, poor design, and inadequate supervision, 
unnoticed defects in manufacturing (Reason, 1997). Latent conditions considered the 
source of ignition of any accident or error (Reason, 2000).    
The holes in the model are not static.  They move from one position to another, 
may open or close, and change in size continuously depending on the situation and the 
climate of the system.  According to Sidney Dekker (2002), it is the investigator’s job to 





changes.  Finally, the investigator must determine how the holes line up to produce 
accidents since all holes must align through all the defensive layers for the trajectory to 
pass through and cause the adverse event as shown in Exhibit 1. 
Exhibit 1. The Swiss Cheese Model 
 
 In contrary to the latest version where the layers are not specified, Exhibit 2 
shows the previous version of the model, where it consisted of five layers as follows: 
• Fallible decisions 
• Line management deficiencies 
• Psychological precursors of unsafe acts 
• Unsafe acts 
• Inadequate defenses 
The current version is not limited to certain numbers of defensive layers nor have 
they been labeled or specified.  Thus, a variety of layers of defenses and safeguards 
can be adapted to this model from different organizational environments depending 






Exhibit 2. First Version of The Swiss Cheese Model 
 
The Swiss Cheese Model in Aviation 
 Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) conducted a study to identify the holes and 
safeguards of the aviation system.  They were able to precisely target each defensive 
layer and classify its holes (i.e. unsafe acts and latent conditions).  They categorize the 
layers into four levels of human failure where each layer influenced the succeeding one 
as shown in Exhibit 3.  







 Each of the following bullets represents a defensive layer in the model: 
• Unsafe acts 
o Errors 






• Preconditions for unsafe acts 
o Substandard conditions for operators 
! Adverse mental states 
! Adverse physiological states 
! Physical/mental limitations 
o Substandard practices of operators 
! Crew resource mismanagement 
! Personal readiness 
• Unsafe supervision 
o Inadequate supervision 
o Planned inappropriate operations 
o Failed to correct problem 
o Supervisory violations 





o Recourse management 
o Organizational climate 
o Organizational process 
 Under each bullet, they identified whether the corresponding potential error was 
an active or a latent failure. 
The application of the Swiss Cheese Model for aviation was successful to an 
extent.  Several modifications were made to the original model to make it specific to 
aviation.  Over 300 naval aviation accidents were assessed to identify the holes and 
defensive layers that are specific to the aviation industry.  The Swiss Cheese Model for 
Aviation cannot be applied successfully to other industries because of its specificity. 
 According to (Reason, et al., 2006, 9) “The model was intended to be a generic 
tool that could be used in any well defended domain—it is for the local investigators to 
supply the local details”. 
 
The Swiss Cheese Model in Medicine Management and Health Care 
 Avery et al. (2002) adapted the Swiss Cheese Model for management of 
medicine.  Errors in the process of medicine management are considered an important 
cause of induced harm in health care.  For example, a patient suffered an adverse event 
after using a previously prescribed medicine without considering its current 
contraindications with his/her developing health situation.  The slices of cheese, (i.e. the 
defensive layers), were introduced and both active failures and latent conditions were 
classified.  The following model shown in Exhibit 4 was then generalized to be used in 





Exhibit 4. The Swiss Cheese Model of Error in Medicine Management 
 
 Other representations of the model were adapted for use in health care institutions 
and hospitals.  Carthey et al. (2001) demonstrated the use of this model for determining 
cardiac surgery accident causation as shown in Exhibit 5.  
 They classified the defensive layers into five categories: 
• Health care organization 
• Hospital management 
• Cardiac surgery department 
• Preoperative decision making 
• Intraoperative problems 
 In their paper, they illustrated some examples of the active failures and latent 






Exhibit 5. Generic Organizational Accident Model Applied to Health Care 
System (Carthey et al., 2001) 
 
 
 In the previous applications, the investigators discussed brief examples of the 
latent conditions and active failures without identifying the location of holes and their 
sizes.  In contrast to the aviation model, which can be generalized to the whole aviation 
industry, the previous health care models were limited to each specific branch of the 
health care industry; models for medicine management would not apply to cardiac 
surgery and vice versa.  
 
The Swiss Cheese Model in Engineering Management Perspective 
For the rest of this paper, we will illustrate how to classify and adapt the Swiss 








The Space Shuttle Challenger Incident 
In 1986 the Space Shuttle Challenger, exploded 74 seconds after launch killing 
seven astronauts including the teacher in space.  Technically, the main cause of the 
disaster was the O-ring designs.  According to the presidential commission report (1986), 
the cause of the accident was the failure, due to improper design, of the pressure seal in 
the aft field joint of the right solid rocket booster.  Top management, line managers, 
engineers, companies, and the organizational climate contributed to the disaster.  We will 




Errors in the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger were unintentional.  Blame 
cannot be attributed to a pilot, crewmember, operator, or controller.  The incident was 
due to poor decision-making at the upper management level, which constitutes an unsafe 
act under the decision error type (Orasanu, 1993).  The commander and pilot flying the 
shuttle are considered the direct operators, but in the Challenger disaster it was not their 
choice whether or not to launch; it was the decision maker’s.  Therefore, the unsafe act 
defensive layer might not be applicable in the case of the Challenger, thus this layer 
would be removed from the model.  However, according to the Swiss Cheese Model, it 
takes both active failure and latent condition to cause an accident, so removing an 







Psychological Precursors of Unsafe Acts 
The weather on the day of the launch was threatening, thus introducing latent 
failure.  For a successful reseal of the O-ring, the environmental temperature should be ≥ 
53°F.  According to Thiokol, low temperature would jeopardize the capability of the 
secondary sealing of the Solid Rocket Motor (Kerzner, 2009).  Communicating that issue 
was complicated by the fact that engineers use technical jargon that is not always 
understood by upper management.  Moreover, the ice on the launch pad introduced 
additional risk factors to the launch operation.  The ice also covered the handrails and 
walkways surrounding the shuttle, which presented hindrances to emergency access.  In 
addition, availability of spare parts, physical dimension, material characteristics, and 
effects of reusability were other factors that may have contributed to the disaster. 
 
Line Management Deficiencies 
Line management did not adequately enforce a safety program (Kerzner, 2009).  
As a result, all risks were treated as anomaly and that became the norm in the NASA 
culture.  An escape system during launch was not designed due to overconfidence in the 
reliability of the space shuttle and that having a plan would be cost effective.  A latent 
failure introduced an unsafe act which violated the most important factor; the safety of 
the crew.  Pressure to launch on the designated schedule due to competition, politics, 
media, and congress issues made it hard for line managers to communicate the engineers 
concerns and reports to top decision makers and administrators.  Problems that were 





the two organizations due to lack of problem reporting procedures.  The lack of 
communication introduced a latent failure. 
 
Fallible Decisions 
 Budget was a major constraint at NASA at that time.  Consequently, top 
management at NASA approved the design of the solid rocket motor in its entirety, 
including the O-ring joint, even when this meant changing the research direction at a 
great cost.  Risk was accepted at all levels since calculated safety projections were 
favorable.  A NASA position for permanent administrator was empty for four months 
prior to the accident, and turnover rate of upper management was considerably high, 
which resulted in   a breakdown in communication from the top down.   Moreover, lack 
of communication between NASA’s top decision makers and Thiokol’s technical 
engineers introduced a gap where problem reporting remained in house.  Concerns never 
reached top officials in NASA for fear of job loss.  Moreover, bad news was generally 
downplayed to protect the interests of higher officials.  In general, there was no accepted 
standard for problem reporting that transected all levels of either NASA or Thiokol. 
 There was no clear recommendation from Thiokol not to launch under the cold 
weather condition (Kerzner, 2009).  According to (The Presidential Commission on the 
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Report 1986, 82) regarding the launch decision, 
“Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems 
concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written 
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 





management reversed its position.  They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's 
concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad.  If the decision makers 
had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch 
51-L on January 28, 1986”.  The general lack of communication both between NASA and 
Thiokol, and internally within each organization, functions as a latent condition. 
 
Summary of The Space Shuttle Challenger Incident 
 The Space Shuttle Challenger’s holes were not identified in sufficient time for 
safeguards to be implemented to prevent such catastrophic loss. Moreover, there was no 
active failure involved in the front end layer of defense; all decisions were made from the 
top management level of the organization.  With the miscommunication that occurred 
between NASA and Thiokol, the administrators at NASA were not aware of the potential 
risk that was involved with the launch decision.  As a result, the unsafe acts layer of 
defense was discarded, resulting in a critical flaw in the Swiss Cheese Model—without 
the provisions to counteract or override unsafe acts, the model is inadequate for accident 
prevention.  Further investigation is needed to determine whether another model may be 
more successful in addressing complex systems such as the NASA space shuttle launch, 
in terms of identifying risk factors and predicting potential accidents. 
 
The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Incident 
The Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster will demonstrate how active failures and 
latent conditions merge to cause a catastrophic adverse event that could have been 





Reef its way to transport crude oil from Alaska to California.  Approximately 10 million 
gallons of crude oil were spilled into the Prince William Sound, Alaska, after eight cargo 
tanks were ruptured.  The incident caused a huge environmental issue, and the cost of 
cleaning the water exceeded $2 billion in addition to the costs of vessel damage and the 
various lawsuits from the environmental agencies, fishermen and other affected parties 
were filed (Harrald, et al., 1990).  Human error contributed greatly to the accident.  Errors 
were made from all levels of the organization.  We will next utilize the Swiss Cheese 
Model of Accident Causation to analyze this incident and its contributed factors. 
 
Unsafe Acts 
 The holes in this layer of the model were essential to cause the accident along 
with the latent condition that existed: 
• The crew did not get enough time to rest before departing the port.  Which is 
considered a violation of the amount of sleep required before being able to go on 
a cargo watch task.  As a result, the crewmembers suffered fatigue due to the 
impaired task performance (National Transportation Safety Board, 1990). 
• The crew also violated the procedures of consuming alcohol before and while on 
mission on the vessel.  Evident showed that the master, the captain and the other 
mates on the vessel were intoxicated. 
• The captain violated the navigation rules by travelling outside the normal 
shipping lanes in an attempt to avoid ice.  Violating the procedures of slowing 





• The captain also violated procedures by not being accurate and precise in 
reporting position and speed of the vessel on time. 
• Incorrect procedure was taken by crewmember to maneuver the vessel to avoid 
ice.  
• The crew violated the Exxon Shipping Company Navigation and Bridge 
Organization Manual by reducing the number of officers required on the bridge.  
For the specific situation on the vessel, two navigating officers were required to 
attend on the bridge.  Unfortunately only one was there since the captain was 
absent. 
• The captain engaged the vessel on autopilot violating the regulation set by the 
USCG. Also violating the standing orders of the Exxon Shipping Company that 
steering should always be manual if navigating near the shore or shallow banks 
(Alaska Spill Oil Commission, 1990). 
 
Psychological Precursors of Unsafe Acts 
 Some of the major latent conditions that factored in the accident: 
• The presence of the icebergs 
• Crewmembers fatigue condition due to lack of sleep 
• The alcohol-impaired captain on board 
• Inadequate training on vessel maneuvering 
• Reduced number of manpower in the port, the bridge and on vessel 
• Lack of procedures with regards to hours-of-service (National Transportation 





 The previous latent conditions represent the weaknesses in the safeguards of the 
system of the Exxon Valdez.  If these were detected in proper time, the accident would 
not have happened. 
 
Line Management Deficiencies 
 Inadequate supervision at the port and on board vessel was the main cause of 
generating the holes on this defensive layer: 
• The captain did not request to stay longer at the port for the crew to get enough 
rest. 
• Failing to correct the shortage of officers and crewmembers required in port and 
on vessel that caused impaired task performance 
• Lack of problem reporting communication between the vessel and the port 
• Inadequate instructions were communicated to crewmembers with regards to 
procedures in maneuvering the vessel. 
• Lack of feedback when problems were reported to the captain 
• Incorrect procedures with regards to navigating the vessel through ice 




 The weakness of this defensive layer demonstrated how inadequate regulations 
and supervisions resulted in catastrophic accident: 





• Limitation of the technology available and required equipment in case of such 
accident (Harrald et al., 1990) 
• Lack of resources; i.e. crewmembers 
• Lack of procedure regarding crew members safety and drug tests 
• Lack of training for crewmembers 
• Poor utilization of safety plans and communication equipment - There is evidence 
that the radar on the port was not working effectively at the time the vessel was 
navigating (Leveson, 2005).	  
• Assigning a master before proofing his alcohol problem was under control.	  
 
Summary of The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Incident 
 The Exxon Valdez oil spill incident’s demonstrated how all levels of the 
organization can contribute to the cause of a catastrophic disaster.  Blame cannot be 
pointed to the crewmembers alone in this incident due to the lack of regulations and the 
norm of organizational behavior, where violating the procedures were practiced to 
overcome obstacles and meet schedules.  The holes in the Exxon Valdez oil spill were 
identified in each layer.  The holes lined up in the stacked weak defensive layer, and the 
trajectory of accident breach causing the unfortunate disaster, which could have been 
avoided if these unsafe acts and their related latent conditions were identified in the 









 Human errors have caused numerous catastrophic disasters over the past decades. 
Tracking the causes of these error will reveals contributing factors to these errors. The 
Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation suggested that in order for an accident to 
occur all the safeguards in the organization have to be breached with a trajectory that 
passes through all the holes, which includes unsafe acts and latent conditions. Identifying 
and characterizing these holes and preparing the corresponding defensive safeguards 
early in the system will make it almost impossible for a trajectory to pass through every 
layer. Unfortunately, Reason did not specify how to apply the Swiss Cheese Model. He 
suggested the theory and handed it over to the investigators to identify all the holes and 
defensive layers. However, it is unclear how to allocate the holes and measure their sizes, 
or how to relate each of the active failures to the corresponding latent condition. The 
Swiss Cheese Model was not successfully utilized in the Space Shuttle Challenger 
incident due to the lack of one vital defensive layer; the unsafe act. However, the model 
was valid for the Exxon Valdez oil spill incident. Both accidents were caused mainly by 
human error and were operating as a complex system. After examining the previous 
engineering management applications, it turned out that not all complex accidents could 
be investigated using the Swiss Cheese Model.  Further instructions and modifications 
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Abstract 
 Managers seeking to assess risk within complex systems face enormous 
challenges. They must identify a seemingly endless number of risks and develop 
contingency plans accordingly. This study explores the strengths and limitations of two 
categories of risk assessment tools: product assessment techniques including Failure 
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Risk in Early Design (RED) and process 
assessment techniques, such as Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and the Swiss 
Cheese Model (SCM). A NASA case study is used to evaluate these risk assessment 
models. The case study considers the January 1986 explosion of the Space Shuttle 
Challenger, 73 seconds after liftoff. This incident resulted in the loss of seven crew 
members and consequently grave criticisms of NASA’s risk management practices. The 
paper concludes with comparison and recommendations for engineering managers on 







Introduction to Risk Assessment 
 Risk exists in our everyday activities from getting out of bed in the morning to the 
most complicated task in any complex system. Managers need to consider a wide range 
of risks, including risks related to products’ component failure, human error, and 
operational failure. There are a variety of assessment tools for each of these risk types. 
 The Human Systems Integration Handbook (Booher, 2003) lists 101 techniques 
available for evaluating safety in complex systems. Even with this wealth of tools, or 
perhaps because of them, mitigating risks remains a daunting task. Various authors have 
generated definitions of risk. According to Covello and Merkhofer, risk is defined as “a 
characteristic of a situation or action wherein two or more outcomes are possible, the 
particular outcome that will occur is unknown, and at least one of the possibilities is 
undesired” (Covello & Merkhofer, 1993). NASA defines risk as the chance (qualitative) 
of loss of personnel capability, loss of system, or damage to or loss of equipment or 
property (National Research Council, 1988). Another definition of risk was founded by 
the Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS), which states “Risk is a 
combination of the likelihood of an occurrence of a hazardous event or exposure(s) and 
the severity of injury or ill health that can be caused by the event or exposure(s)” 
(OHSAS, 2007). 
Taxonomies of risk have been established in the literature where some risks were 
categorized according to their source, for example, political, environmental, and 
economic risk sources. Risks can also be categorized according to industry or service 
segment or according to their order of significance from the user’s perspective. These 





investigation for further risk classification, or even omitting unidentified ones. In that 
case, engineers and managers must have risk assessment tools as part of their risk 
management programs available in hand along with the existing taxonomies to evaluate a 
design for risks (Letens, Van Nuffel, Heene, & Leysen, 2008). 
   “Risk assessment is the process of identification, evaluation, acceptance, 
aversion, and management of risk” (Eccleston, 2011). A study conducted by interviewing 
51 project managers proved that experience alone does not contribute to risk 
identification among engineers and managers as much as the level of education, 
information search style, and training (Maytorena, Winch, Freeman, & Kiely, 2007). 
 Murray developed a generic risk matrix that can be adapted by project 
management to quickly identify potential risk, probability, and impact (Murray, 
Grantham, & Damle, 2011). After identifying risks and quantifying their magnitude, the 
next step in risk assessment is to evaluate the associated decisions to be made and their 
impact. There are various risk assessment tools for different risk environments such as 
nuclear reactors, chemical plants, health industry, construction, automotive industry, 
project management, financial industry, and others. In general, they all address three 
issues: the adverse event, its likelihood, and its consequences. Reducing the probability 
of failure and its consequences has been the major goal of reliability and safety analysis. 
 Failures can cause loss of life, significant financial expenses, and environmental 
harm (Henley & Kumamoto, 1981). Determining the appropriate assessment tool(s) is the 
first step in risk analysis. These can include simple, qualitative, quantitative, and hybrid 
assessment approaches (National Research Council, 2007). The purpose of this paper is 





assessment tools to assist engineers, managers, and decision makers in selecting the 
proper tools for the specific situation. The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster is used to 
demonstrate the differences among the techniques.   
 
Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster	  
 On January 28, 1986 the Space Shuttle Challenger took off for the last time. Its 
flight lasted just over a minute when the Space Shuttle exploded resulting in the loss of 
all its seven crew members. The Challenger was the most anticipated launch for NASA 
and was supposed to be a milestone for more than one reason. The technical cause for the 
accident was determined to be the erosion of the o-ring on one of the solid rocket 
boosters, which allowed the passage of hot gases. This caused the release of hydrogen 
into the external tank, which deflagrated and caused the shuttle to blow up. 
 Unfortunately, this technical glitch was just one of the factors attributed to the 
failure of this high profile space mission.  
 Over the next three months, a presidential commission led by former Secretary of 
State William P. Rogers and a NASA team investigated the accident (Damle & Murray, 
2012). The commission concluded that there was a serious flaw in the decision making 
process leading up to the launch. A well structured and managed system emphasizing 
safety would have flagged the rising doubts about the solid rocket booster joint seal. Had 
these matters been clearly stated and emphasized in the flight readiness process in terms 
reflecting the views of most of the Thiokol (a subcontractor responsible for the solid 
rocket boosters (SRBs)) engineers and at least some of the Marshall Space Center 





 Apparently, Thiokol was pressured into giving a go ahead for the launch by 
NASA.  
 Reasons for the disaster (Damle & Murray, 2012):  
1. Faulty o-ring – The o-ring sealing in the solid rocket boosters eroded and let hot 
gases pass through causing an explosion. 
2. Application beyond operational specifications – The o-rings had been tested at 
530F before, but were never exposed to launch day temperatures of 260F. 
3. Communication – Thiokol and NASA were geographically away from one 
another and travel for meetings was not feasible. This led to communication issues 
between the two organizations.  
4. Management pressure – The engineers at Thiokol knew about the o-ring’s poor 
performance at low temperatures, but management forced them to let go of technical 
issues citing “broader picture.” 
5. Risk management – Proper risk management methods were not in place at 
NASA. The criticality of the o-ring problem had been downgraded without sufficient 
evidence. Also, it had become a norm to issue waivers against problems to meet the 
schedule requirements of flights.   
6. Global competition – The European Space Agency had started competing for 
the commercial satellite business. Also, NASA had to beat the Russians at deploying a 
probe into Haley Comet from the same launch station, which meant the Challenger had 





7. Budget pressure – NASA was tight on budget and hence had to curb many of its 
research and development activities. Also, it had to launch a large number of flights 
that year to justify expenditure on the Space Shuttle program.  
8. Political pressure – President Reagan was supposed to announce the inclusion 
of a school teacher on the Challenger mission at his State of Union Speech. This put 
additional pressure on NASA to launch the spacecraft as scheduled. This also attracted 
excessive media attention on this mission and NASA felt its reputation was at stake. 
 Prior to the Challenger accident in 1986, NASA emphasized quantitative risk 
analysis such as Fault Tree Analysis. The low probability of success during the Apollo 
moon missions intimidated NASA from persuading further quantitative risk or reliability 
analysis (Stamatelatos, Vesely, Dugan, Fragola, Minarick, & Railsback, 2002). More 
recently NASA moved from a preference for qualitative methods such as FMEA in 
assessing mission risks to an understanding of the importance of the probabilistic risk 
assessment such as FTA (Stamatelatos, et al., 2002). Process-based risk assessment 
techniques were not common prior to the Challenger Disaster. It was not until the early 
1990s that the first process safety risk assessment techniques were introduced (Center for 
Chemical Process Safety, 2001). Cost was a factor in NASA's preference for qualitative 
over quantitative risk assessment. Gathering data for every single component of the 
shuttle to generate statistical models that are the backbone of probabilistic assessment 








Types of Risk Assessment Tools 
 This paper considers risk assessment tools in two broad categories: product-based 
tools and process-based tools. Product-based tools concentrate on failures at the 
component level, including product design shortcomings and failures. This paper 
introduces FMEA, FTA, and Risk in Early Design (RED) in this category. These tools, in 
spite of being comprehensive, fail to address systemic issues, mainly relating to human 
error, decision making errors, culture issues, external pressures on decision making 
process, and inadequate user training. Many of these issues were encountered in the 
Challenger accident. This paper also considers process-based risk assessment including 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and the Swiss Cheese Model. These methods strive 
to consider the system as a whole, with due consideration to organizational issues and 
human error causes. Detailed descriptions of the methods and their application to the 
Challenger accident follow.  
 
Product-Based Risk Assessment Tools 
 Product risk assessment tools investigate risks associated with the system from the 
component level and the product design. Product-based risk assessment tools are 
categorized into qualitative and quantitative tools, where the probabilities of failure 
occurrence are quantified in the latter one. Both of these types of risk assessment tools 
can be used throughout the product life cycle, even simultaneously, to identify potential 
risks. Product-based risk assessment tools do not consider the human factors due to the 






Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a very structured and reliable 
bottom-up method to classify hardware and system failures. Applying FMEA can be easy 
even in a complex system due to the simplicity of the method. FMEA increases design 
safety by identifying hazards early in the product lifecycle when improvements can be 
made cost effectively (Dhillon, 1999). In spite of the fact that FMEA is very efficient, if 
it is applied to the system as a whole, it may not be as easy if the system consists of a 
number of components with multiple functions (Stamatis, 2003). FMEA only considers 
hazards that lead to failure. It does not address potential hazards that result from normal 
operations (NASA, 2001). Other negative aspects of the detailed FMEA format include 
being very time consuming and expensive, due to its detailed nature. 
A significant concern for complex systems with human interaction is that FMEA 
does not consider failures that could arise due to human error (Foster, et al., 1999). 
NASA used FMEA on the overall Space Shuttle program, also known as the Space 
Transportation Systems (STS), the Ground Support Equipment (GSE), and individual 
missions to identify the Critical Item List (CIL). This list consists of failure modes sorted 
according to their severity starting with the worst (National Research Council, 1988). 
Exhibit 1 explains the consequence classification system at NASA where critical items 










Exhibit 1: The Consequences Classification System (Kerzner, 2009) 
 
Level Description 
Criticality 1 (C1) Loss of life and/or vehicle if the component fails 
Criticality 1R (C1R) Redundant components exist; the failure of both could cause loss of life 
and/or vehicle 
 
Criticality 2 (C2) Loss of mission if the component fails 
Criticality 2R (C2R) Redundant components exist; the failure of both could cause loss of mission 
 
Criticality 3 (C3) All others 
 
In 1982 (four years before the Challenger explosion), FMEA revealed that the 
Space Shuttle’s o-ring seal had a criticality rating of 1 (Winsor, 1988). However, it was 
only one of over 700 criticality 1 classified components that existed in 1985 (Kerzner, 
2009). During this time period, C1 risk items were considered acceptable risks and 
waivers were issued by managers.  
 
Fault Tree Analysis 
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down probabilistic risk assessment technique. 
It is a deductive method that investigates the factors and conditions that contribute to 
adverse events in a system. It utilizes logic gates and graphical diagrams to identify the 
failures in the system, subsystem, and components. The FTA starts with a critical root 
event and proceeds with determining all the possible potential causes, parallel and 
sequential, that contribute to the top adverse event and represents it as a cause-and-effect 





a fault tree. Different people can come up with different fault trees for the same root 
event. FTA is a probabilistic risk assessment tool that can be quantitatively evaluated 
using the rules of Boolean algebra between its gates. 
The strength of the FTA is that it is a visual model that clearly depicts the cause-
and-effect relationship between the root cause events to provide both qualitative and 
quantitative results (Bertsche, 2008). Another benefit of the FTA is that it concentrates on 
one particular failure at a time. The detailed, structured approach also has the advantage 
of requiring the analyst to study the system in great detail in an organized manner, which 
can reduce the danger of overlooking risk factor(s) (Dhillon, 1999). 
 This technique suffers from a few limitations. A fault tree might not be able to 
capture all the error causes that are related to humans due to the complexity of human 
behavior. Accounting for human error in fault trees can make the analysis too 
complicated and unmanageable (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992). For every top-level hazard 
that is identified, a thorough fault tree must be constructed which is time consuming and 
lengthy. Some large fault trees may not fit into a reliability report due to their size and 
complexity. Latent hazards may not be identified during the construction of a fault tree. 
 In January 1988, after the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster, the Shuttle 
Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee recommended that NASA 
apply probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods to the risk management program 
(Stamatelatos & Dezfuli, 2011). According to NASA “No comprehensive reference 
currently exists for PRA applications to aerospace systems. In particular, no 
comprehensive reference for applying FTA to aerospace systems currently exists.” 





Risk in Early Design 
 The Risk in Early Design (RED) theory was developed in 2005 by Grantham et 
al. to assist engineers in risk assessment by automatically generating lists of potential 
product risks based on historical information (Grantham, Stone, & Tumer, 2009). With 
given product function as inputs, RED generates the historically relevant potential failure 
modes of those functions and ranks them by both their likelihood of occurrence and the 
consequence, ranking from one as least severe to five as most severe of those failures. 
 Unlike FMEA and FTA, which require experts to identify potential failure modes, 
RED utilizes a historical knowledgebase to produce the potential risks. This feature is 
beneficial for novice engineers who do not have substantial experience predicting 
failures; it is also beneficial for newer systems that can benefit from the performance of 
older products while determining potential failures. While it is highly recommended by 
the developers that experts review the RED output and assess its relevance to the system 
under study, a drawback of this risk assessment method is potential risk over or under 
quantification. Further, the method is only as good as the knowledgebase used to generate 
the risks. 
 
Using RED to Analyze the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster 
 The first step in applying RED to identify and analyze risks is to select the 
functions performed by components of the product from the provided list of 
electromechanical functions from the RED software tool, http://idecms.srv.mst.edu/ide/. 
 For the Challenger Disaster, a “human centric, subsystem level” risk analysis of 





selected that represented the functionality of the SRBs. From those 21 functions, 402 
risks were identified (7 high risks–upper right hand region, 130 moderate risks-middle 
region, and 265 low risks-left/lower-left hand region). The risk fever chart produced by 
RED is shown in Exhibit 2. The examples from the detailed report are included in Exhibit 
3. Referring to Exhibit 3, of the seven high risks identified, five were suggested to fail 
due to high cycle fatigue, and the remaining two were suggested to fail due to brittle 
fracture. This is interesting because at the cold temperatures of the Challenger launch, the 
material used for the o-rings took on more brittle characteristics. Also, the functions most 
closely associated with the o-ring, “stop gas” and “stop liquid,” generated interesting 
risks related to the Challenger Disaster. For example, “stop gas” was linked with the 
following potential failure modes and likelihood-consequence pairs: brittle fracture 
(likelihood-1, consequence-4) and thermal shock (likelihood-1, consequence-4), which 
are both low risks. Similarly, “stop liquid” was linked with the following potential failure 
modes and likelihood-consequence pairs: brittle fracture (likelihood-2, consequence-5) 
and thermal shock (likelihood-1, consequence-5), which are both medium risks. The 
classification of the risks is due to the low likelihood rating of the failures on the risk 
fever chart. However, the consequence ratings represent the severity of the event, where 
(consequence = 4) indicates total malfunction of the SRBs and (consequence = 5) 
indicates loss of life. The risk ratings produced by RED are consistent with the 
expectations that cold weather is not likely at a Space Shuttle launch; however, should it 















Exhibit 3: Examples from the detailed RED report 
 
   Risk Level  Function  Failure Mode Likelihood Consequence 
High Change Electrical Energy High Cycle Fatigue 5 5 
High Stop Solid High Cycle Fatigue 5 5 
High Store Solid High Cycle Fatigue 5 5 
High Change Solid High Cycle Fatigue 4 5 
High Stop Solid Brittle Fracture 3 5 
High Store Solid Brittle Fracture 3 5 
High Export Gas-Gas Mixture High Cycle Fatigue 3 5 
Med Export Gas-Gas Mixture Stress Corrosion 3 4 
Med Change Solid Stress Corrosion 3 4 
Med Stop Solid Stress Corrosion 3 4 
Med Change Electrical Energy Stress Corrosion 3 4 
Med Store Solid Stress Corrosion 3 4 
 
 High risk 
 Low Risk 





Product-Based Risk Assessment Tool Summary 
 FMEA, FTA, and RED have their limitations and merits, and they complement 
each other well. FMEA is used to identify the potential failure modes of the system 
components; this was done by NASA to generate the critical items list for the Space 
Shuttle program. FTA, on the other hand, evaluates each of the critical items to find its 
cause(s). Both can be used repeatedly throughout the system design cycle. FTA and 
FMEA are standard risk assessment techniques for product components but they share the 
shortcomings that they do not include human error and hostile environment (Qureshi, 
2008). RED identifies and assesses risk in the early design phase, which aids managers 
and decision makers in minimizing the subjectivity of the likelihoods and consequences. 
Due to the simplicity of RED, managers with less experience in risk assessment can 
easily adapt the tool and apply it at the conceptual phase. These risk assessment tools aid 
the engineering manager in identifying a variety of hazards and associated causes at a 
component level. 
 
Process-Based Risk Assessment Tools 
  Process-based risk assessment tools use a system-wide approach. Instead of 
identifying risks related to component and product design, these tools identify risks that 
can be encountered in the entire process, including those related to humans, organization, 
management, and decision making. Hence, risks involved with all entities concerned with 
the product are considered. The following process-based models consider risk on a 
broader system level, thus, widening the scope of risk assessment compared to the 





Layer of Protection Analysis 
  Among the various existing risk management techniques being used today, 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is widely used in the process industry (Center for 
Chemical Process Safety, 2001). It is a semi-quantitative analytical tool to assess the 
adequacy of protection layers used to mitigate risk (Summers, 2002). LOPA is a process 
hazard analysis (PHA) tool. The method utilizes the hazardous events, event severity, 
initiating causes, and initiating event likelihood data developed during the hazard and 
operability analysis (HAZOP). The LOPA method allows the user to determine the risk 
associated with the various hazardous events by utilizing their severity and the likelihood 
of the events being initiated. LOPA identifies the causes of each adverse event and 
estimates the corresponding initiating event likelihood. Then, it determines the 
independent protection layers (IPL) for each pair of cause-consequence scenarios and 
addresses the probability of failure on demand (PFD) accordingly. To quantify the 
mitigated event frequency for each IPL, LOPA multiplies each initiating event frequency 
by the PFD, then compares the result to the criteria for tolerable risk (Dowell, 1999). 
  LOPA focuses on one cause-consequence scenario at a time. Using corporate 
risk standards, the user can determine the total amount of risk reduction required and 
analyze the risk reduction that can be achieved from various layers of protection 
(Frederickson, 2002).  IPLs, as shown in Exhibit 4, are simply safety systems that meet 
the following criteria (Summers, 2002) – 






2. Independence – An IPL should be independent of any other IPL or of the 
initiating event. This way, failure of one does not affect performance of any other IPL. 
3. Dependability – The IPL reduces the risk by a known amount with a known 
frequency. 
4. Auditability - IPL should allow for regular validation. 




 The IPLs perform three main functions of prevention (to reduce the probability of 
accident), protection (to detect the initiating cause and neutralize it) and mitigation (to 
control/reduce the accident severity) (Markowski & Mannan, 2010). LOPA has 





scenarios that are too complex to be qualitatively evaluated, compared to a regular 
quantitative risk method. It proves to be very effective in resolving disagreements in 
decision making since it provides a clear, simple, and concise scenario structure to 
estimate risk. The output of LOPA is vital to assign safeguards during different situations 
such as operation and maintenance to assure safety of employee, assets, environment and 
organization. Also, by design, LOPA deals with general decision making in risk 
assessment; it is not intended to be used for detailed decision making (Center for 
Chemical Process Safety, 2001). A valuable feature of LOPA is that the quantified output 
of the analysis can reduce the uncertainty about residual risk levels (Gulland, 2004). The 
primary disadvantage of the method is that the numbers generated are only an 
approximation and, hence, its application requires a certain degree of experience while 
evaluating and assessing scenarios. 
 
Using LOPA to Analyze the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster 
 In the case of the Space Shuttle Challenger, the system under consideration is 
the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) o-ring sealing, which eventually blew up due to the o-
ring’s failure to contain hot gases. Different layers can be designed to capture this 
problem at an initial stage, as per the LOPA model (Damle & Murray, 2012).  Exhibit 5 





























Exhibit 6: Layer Definitions and Flow (Damle & Murray, 2012) 
 
 
 The following demonstrates how NASA could have applied the LOPA technique 
to the Space Shuttle.  
 Layer 1 – Testing 
Each component going into the Space Shuttle is tested prior to delivery at the vendor’s 
location. In this case, SRBs have to be tested as per test plans by NASA. Any conditions 
beyond the testing specifications should be deemed risky and retesting at new parameters 






 Layer 2 – Communication   
Any observation made during testing should be documented and clearly communicated to 
all persons involved. Any discrepancy or non-conformity should be immediately flagged 
and necessary actions should be recommended through two-way communication with the 
end user (NASA). Any phone calls should also be logged so that they can be referred to 
in the future, in case issues arise later. 
 Layer 3 – Safety Environment 
There needs to be an inherent safety environment within the organization. Any problem, 
when detected should be brought to the notice of immediate superiors, while critical 
issues should be escalated before it is too late in the process. With a safety environment, 
every employee is safety concerned and works towards making the entire system as safe 
as possible. The voice of every employee regarding safety matters should be given due 
attention. 
 Layer 4 – Risk Management Plan 
There is usually a risk management plan in place. The most crucial aspect of the plan is to 
adhere to the severity definitions and the risk matrix. Risk assessment should be carried 
out using a comprehensive method for identifying potential failures and a specific 
quantitative methodology should be used to assess safety risks (National Research 
Council, 1988). The criticality of any risk should not be downgraded, especially when 
human life is at stake. Waivers should only be issued under extremely special conditions 
and should need to have multiple signatories including top management. It should not be 
a norm to issue waivers for small issues, which might eventually lead to bigger problems. 





criticality items and improve them prior to flight. An audit panel should verify the 
adequacy of the report and report directly to the Administrator of NASA (U.S. 
Presidential Commission, 1986).  
 Layer 5 - Flight Readiness Review 
The Flight Readiness Review (FRR) is a meeting of all teams and management to check 
if all components are in place for a launch. This also includes confirming that the parts 
are manufactured to specifications. Managers provide evidence that all work to prepare a 
Space Shuttle for flight was done as required. This is a crucial meeting and the FRR 
should be used to escalate issues if they were not addressed by immediate supervisors. 
Considering the criticality of the risk involved, there should be no concessions on 
specifications or quality of work. Lack of sufficient test data for the given conditions 
should not be interpreted as a go ahead for application.  
 Layer 6 – Launch Commit Criteria 
This is the final check before any Space Shuttle takes flight. A formal prelaunch weather 
briefing is held two days prior to launch (NASA, 2010). This includes weather data 
specifications including temperature, winds, cloud ceilings, and thunderstorms. These 
criteria specify the weather limits at which launch can be conducted. These criteria 
should be strictly followed, and no waivers should be allowed based on pressures from 
external factors. Launching in spite of bad weather conditions is a decision that most 
certainly increases the risk of a major disaster.  
 The Probability to Fail on Demand (PFD) is difficult to determine at this stage. In 
the Challenger case, loss of life is the consequence. Thus, the severity of consequence is 





as there is no historical data. The frequency of the consequence occurrence depends on 
probability to fail on demand (PFD) of every protection layer. For the cases considered, 
the protection layers are not engineering systems or devices. Hence, their PFDs cannot be 
determined in a manner prescribed in LOPA methodology.  
 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System and the Swiss Cheese Model 
 The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was developed 
to analyze the U.S. Navy’s aviation accidents. It uses James Reason’s Swiss Cheese 
Model for its basic structure. Early in the 1990s, the U.S. Navy was undergoing a high 
rate of accidents, and 80% of the accidents were due to human error (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - HFACS, 2000). 
 Human error is a significant cause of catastrophic accidents in many industries 
(Hollywell, 1996). Investigating why human errors occur can be essential to find an 
accident’s roots cause(s). The more general form of this process-based tool, the Swiss 
Cheese Model, will be used for the discussion and application in this paper.  
 The Swiss Cheese Model was developed by James Reason (1997) to address 
accidents in complex systems where many components interact with each other. The 
model tracks accident causation at different levels of the organization without blaming 
individuals. The Swiss Cheese Model determines the true causes of an accident by 
linking different contributing factors into a rational sequence that runs bottom-up in 
causation and top-down in investigation (Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational 
Accidents, 1997). Reason presents his model as stacked slices of Swiss cheese, where the 





failures (i.e., unsafe acts) and latent conditions. Unsafe acts occur when a human is in 
direct contact with the system, such as during the Chernobyl accident where the operator 
wrongly violated the plant procedures and switched off successive safety systems. Latent 
conditions can occur at any level of the organization or any system and are harder to 
detect. Examples of latent conditions include lack of training, poor design, inadequate 
supervision, and unnoticed defects in manufacturing (Reason, 1997). Latent conditions 
are considered the source of ignition of any accident or error (Reason, 2000). 
 The holes in the model are not static. They move from one position to another, 
and they may open or close and change in size continuously depending on the situation 
and the system climate. According to Dekker, it is the investigator’s job to find out the 
position, type, source, and size of each hole and identify the cause of these changes 
(Dekker, 2002). Finally, the investigator must determine how the holes line up to produce 
accidents since all holes must align through all the defensive layers for the trajectory to 
pass through and cause an adverse event. Exhibit 7 shows the original version of the 
model containing five layers, namely decision makers, line management, preconditions, 










 The enhanced version of the model is not limited to certain numbers of defensive 
layers nor are they labeled or specified by Reason. Thus, a variety of defense layers and 






















safeguards can be adapted to this model from different organizational environments 
depending on the amount of risk involved. Unfortunately, the model does not specifically 
explain the relationship between the various contributing factors, which may result in 
unreliable use of the model (Luxhoj & Kauffeld, 2003).  Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) 
conducted a study to identify the holes and safeguards for an aviation system. They were 
able to precisely target each defensive layer and classify its holes (unsafe acts and latent 
conditions). They categorize the layers into four levels of human failure where each layer 
influenced the succeeding. Exhibit 8 illustrates the HFACS model with proposed 





Exhibit 8: The HFACS framework (Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, 




Using the Swiss Cheese Model to Analyze the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster 
 To examine the Challenger Accident using Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1990), 










 Errors in the launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger were unintentional. Blame 
cannot be attributed to a pilot, crewmember, operator, or controller. The incident was due 
to poor decision-making at the upper management level, which constitutes an unsafe act 
under the decision error type (Orasanu, 1993). The commander and pilot flying the Space 
Shuttle are considered the direct operators, but in the Challenger Disaster, it was not their 
choice whether or not to launch; it was the decision of leaders not on board the shuttle. 
 Therefore, the unsafe act defensive layer might not be applicable for the 
Challenger Accident. This layer would be removed from the model for this application. 
However, according to the Swiss Cheese Model, it takes both active failures and latent 
conditions for the trajectory to pass through the defensive layers and cause an accident. 
 Therefore, removing an essential layer might invalidate the model since the error 
was not made at the operational level.   
 
Preconditions 
 Preconditions are the latent conditions/failures that contributed towards 
occurrence of an accident, such as the poor weather conditions on the day of the launch. 
For a successful reseal of the o-ring, the environmental temperature should be ≥ 53°F. 
 According to Thiokol, low temperature would jeopardize the capability of the 
secondary sealing of the Solid Rocket Motor (Kerzner, 2009). Communicating that issue 
was complicated by the fact that engineers use technical jargon that is not always 





additional risk factors to the launch operation. The ice also covered the handrails and 
walkways surrounding the Space Shuttle, which presented hindrances to emergency 
access. In addition, availability of spare parts, physical dimensions, material 
characteristics, and effects of reusability were other factors that may have contributed to 
the disaster. 
 
Line Management  
 Line management did not adequately enforce the safety program (Kerzner, 2009). 
As a result, all risks were treated as anomaly and that became the norm in the NASA 
culture.  An escape system during launch was not designed due to overconfidence 
in the reliability of the Space Shuttle and a belief that having an escape plan would be 
cost prohibitive. A latent failure introduced an unsafe act, which violated the most 
important factor: the safety of the crew. Pressure to launch on the designated schedule 
due to competition, politics, media, and Congressional issues made it hard for line 
managers to communicate the engineers’ concerns and reports to top decision makers and 
administrators. Problems that were discussed internally at Thiokol and NASA were not 
adequately communicated between the two organizations due to lack of problem 
reporting procedures. The lack of communication introduced a latent failure. 
 
Decision Makers 
 Budget was a major constraint at NASA at the time. Consequently, top 
management at NASA approved the design of the solid rocket motor in its entirety, 





cost. Risk was accepted at all levels since calculated safety projections were favorable.  A 
NASA position for permanent administrator was empty for four months prior to the 
accident, and turnover rate of upper management was relatively high; this added to the 
communication breakdown from the top down.  Moreover, the lack of communication 
between NASA’s top decision makers and Thiokol’s technical engineers introduced a gap 
where problem reporting remained in house. Concerns never reached top officials in 
NASA for fear of job loss. Moreover, bad news was generally downplayed to protect the 
interests of higher officials. In general, there was no accepted standard for problem 
reporting that transected all levels of either NASA or Thiokol. There was no clear 
recommendation from Thiokol not to launch under the cold weather condition (Kerzner, 
2009). According to the U.S. Presidential Commission, (1986) regarding the launch 
decision, “Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems 
concerning the o-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written 
recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 
degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after 
management reversed its position. They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's 
concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decision makers 
had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch 
51-L on January 28, 1986.” The general lack of communication, both between NASA and 








Process-Based Risk Assessment Tool Summary 
 The layers of LOPA clearly expose the problems with launching the Challenger 
Shuttle. It can be seen that management pressures and external political pressures forced 
decisions to be made by violating systems and risk management measures that were in 
place. In spite of the pressure situation, the decision makers at NASA should have 
followed the risk management plan and taken into account issues raised by engineers 
regarding safety of the Space Shuttle. Focusing only on technical safety without 
consideration of decision making and human errors, can cause catastrophes, as was the 
case with this accident. To reduce such incidents in future, the role of human factors in 
system safety should not be neglected, but instead, should be addressed with priority. 
 When closely examining the output of LOPA, this model can be effective in 
identifying the key high risk stages and mitigating the problem at an early stage, with the 
incorporation of control points, procedural checks, regulations at different stages, and 
finally consequence response guidelines. Once the challenge of determining the 
probabilities can be overcome through acceptable assumptions, LOPA can be a powerful 
tool for project managers and risk managers in reducing the chances of a hazard 
occurrence.  
 From the Swiss Cheese Model, the Space Shuttle Challenger’s holes (active 
failures) were not identified in sufficient time for safeguards to be implemented to 
prevent such catastrophic loss. Moreover, there was no active failure involved in the 
front-end layer of defense; all decisions were made from the top management level of the 
organization. With the miscommunication that occurred between NASA and Thiokol, the 





launch decision. As a result, the unsafe acts layer of defense was discarded, resulting in a 
critical flaw in the Swiss Cheese Model—without the provisions to counteract or override 
unsafe acts, the model is inadequate for accident prevention. Further investigation is 
needed to determine whether another model may be more successful in addressing 
complex systems such as the NASA Space Shuttle launch, in terms of identifying risk 
factors and predicting potential accidents. The Swiss Cheese Model was applied 
successfully to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Incident (Altabbakh & Murray, Applying The 
Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation, 2011). Both active failures and latent 
conditions combined and caused a catastrophic adverse event. The active failures were 
due to multiple front line operators including the captain of the vessel and the crew 
members. Unsafe acts were considered both error and violations in the Exxon Valdez Oil 




 After a comprehensive evaluation of the different risk management models 
applied to the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster, we can conclude that these techniques 
are effective for a given scope of risk identification and varying times during the system 
lifecycle. While FMEA, FTA, and RED address risks at the component and sub-system 
level, the Swiss Cheese Model addresses risks related to human system interaction. 
LOPA considers the system in its entirety and designs defense layers to protect the 





 FMEA strives to identify all possible failure modes and identifies a critical item 
list based on the criticality definitions. This can be used at an initial design phase to 
prevent the occurrence of failure modes and take measures according to the 
occurrence/severity ratings. RED can assist designers in identifying the potential risks 
associated with the product at the conceptual phase based on a historical stored data, 
which reduce the subjectivity of the decision made with regards to the likelihood and the 
consequences of failure modes. FTA considers all possible causes leading to an adverse 
event. Engineering managers can check their system stability to make sure all causes 
have been addressed. The logic gates make FTA an effective visual tool. However, FTA 
is dependent on the individual constructing the FTA, and there can be multiple ways of 
doing so. FMEA does not consider any failure modes resulting from normal operation. 
Both FMEA and FTA fail to consider human error as a probable cause of failure. 
 Managers need to be aware that these techniques can be fairly time consuming 
and lengthy and hence demand more resources and longer working time frames.  
 If design changes are not feasible due to financial, technical, or other restrictions, 
managers can explore the possibility of using risk management models, which consider 
risks in a broader perspective. The Swiss Cheese Model has a specific set of identified 
defenses designed to expose the shortcomings within the system when human system 
interaction is involved. It gives considerable weight to human errors and human factors 
when identifying risks. The most valuable contribution of this model is that it also 
considers precursors to unsafe actions, which can help in identifying problems with the 
inherent system construction and hierarchy. The holes in the defenses change according 





during operation of the system. Since it has pre-specified defenses, this model may not be 
applicable to certain systems. It also fails to identify a cause that is unrelated to the 
system (involving human) under consideration. 
 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), a process risk management technique, uses 
identified hazards to build defensive layers around the system under consideration. It is 
easy to deploy because of its scenario-based approach. This technique allows managers to 
not only prevent and protect a system, but also to mitigate the effects of a consequence. 
 No other model considers designing defenses for a post-disaster scenario to 
control the after-effects of the undesirable event. LOPA can be used to include not just 
component risks, but risks related to organizational issues and human factors. It can guide 
or provide a best practice context, when considering generic projects. Managers need to 
note that LOPA requires pre-identified hazards to begin the analysis. The model does not 
consider basic component risks, but is broader, encompassing system/organization wide 
issues. A primary drawback is that it is project-specific, and there are no existing 
references of past applications. The application of this model requires experience due to 
its semi-quantitative nature. 
 Engineering managers should note that there is no one single perfect model for 
risk assessment. Exhibit 9 summarizes the risk assessment tools discussed in this article 
by identifying the pros and cons of each tool/method. The manager has to use sound 
judgment in deciding which method is appropriate for the project. The factors that can 
affect the decision to select a particular model include industry type, phase in the 
product/system lifecycle, time and resources available for risk assessment, and 





component level, FMEA, FTA, and RED are useful. If human errors and organizational 
shortcomings need to be captured, the Swiss Cheese Model or/and LOPA are useful. If 
overall safety of the system needs to be ensured, then LOPA is a useful technique to use.  
 









- Very efficient if applied to 
the system as a whole 
- Structured, detailed 
approach 
- Prioritizes product/process 
deficiencies 
- Identifies and eliminates 
potential failure modes early 
in the development phases 
- Not easy to build if the system 
consists of a number of 
components with multiple 
functions 
- Only considers hazards that lead 
to failure, does not consider 
hazards that result from normal 
operations 
- Time consuming, expensive to 
build and very detailed 
- Does not consider failures 
resulting from human error 
Fault Tree 
Analysis 
- Visual, depicts the cause-
and-effect relationship 
between the root cause 
events 
- Provides Both qualitative 
and quantitative results 
- Concentrates on one 
particular failure at a time 
- Does not capture all failure 
related to human due to the 
complexity of human behavior 
- Time consuming and lengthy 
- Latent hazards are not addressed 
- Requires an expert to identify 
potential risks 
Risk in Early 
Design 
- Utilizes historical 
knowledgebase to produce 
potential risks 
- Well-suited for novice 
engineers  
- Identifies risk in the early 
design phase 
- Potential risk may be over or 
under quantified 









- Identifies risks encountered 
in the entire system, broader 
approach 
- Easy to apply and very 
effective in exposing 
systemic problems 
- Accounts for human error 
- Semi quantitative 
- Takes less time to evaluate 
complex systems 
qualitatively 
- The quantified output is an 
approximation 
- Requires experience in 




- Tracks accident causations 
at different levels of the 
organization 
- Does not blame individuals 
 
- Applicable only when human 
interacts with the system 
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 Risk management has a number of accident causation models that have been used 
for a number of years.  Dr. Nancy Leveson (2002) has developed a new model of 
accidents using a systems approach.  The new model is called Systems Theoretic 
Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP).  It incorporates three basic components: 
constraints, hierarchical levels of control, and process loops.  In this model, accidents are 
examined in terms of why the controls that were in place did not prevent or detect the 
hazard(s) and why these controls were not adequate to enforcing the system safety 
constraints.  A STAMP accident analysis is presented and its usefulness in evaluating 
system safety is compared to more traditional risk models.  STAMP will be applied to a 
case study in the oil industry to demonstrate the practicality and validity of the model. 
 
Keywords 






 Researchers in the safety field are facing more challenges everyday with the 
expanding modern socio-technical systems.  Safety analysis such as hazard analysis, 
accident causation analysis, and risk assessment are being revisited to overcome the 
shortcoming of the conventional safety analysis.  With increasingly complex human 
system interaction in today’s modern systems, new safety challenges are been faced that 
needed to be assessed and addressed.  Indeed, new or improved risk assessment tools that 
can address these complexities are needed. 
 
2. Hazard Analysis 
 Hazard analyses are tools used to detect and classify hazards within a system, 
subsystem, components, and their interactions.  The main purpose of the analysis is to 
identify hazardous conditions or risks and eliminate them or mitigate them (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2008).  Hazard analyses identify hazards, their consequences, 
and their causes to determine system risk and means of mitigating or eliminating those 
hazards (Ericson, 2005).  Ericson categorized hazard analyses into types and techniques. 
 Types would typically determine analysis timing, depth of details and system 
coverage; while techniques would specify the methodology used in the analysis.  There 
are seven types of hazard analysis with regards to system safety (Ericson, 2005): 
• Conceptual design hazard analysis type (CD-HAT) (concept) 
• Preliminary design hazard analysis type (PD-HAT) (preliminary) 
• Detailed design hazard analysis type (DD-HAT) (preliminary) 





• Operations design hazard analysis type (OD-HAT) (test) 
• Health design hazard analysis type (HD-HAT) (operation) 
• Requirements design hazard analysis type (RD-HAT) (final design) 
 
 Each category describes a stage of system life, details required from analyses, 
information available to begin with, and analysis outcome.  There are more than 100 
hazard analysis techniques available (Stephens & Talso, 1999; Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2008). 
 Hazards analysis not only identifies what could fail in a system, but also identifies 
the potential consequences, the reason why it could happen, what are the causal factors, 
and the likelihood of it happening.  Unfortunately, conventional hazard analyses are more 
focused on direct cause and effect relationship following the famous dominos chain of 
events (Hollnagel, 2004).  There are several techniques for hazard analysis to be 
considered when assessing hazards in a system. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), and Hazard and 
Operability Analysis (HAZOP) are examples of the traditional ones.  However, the 
available tools are not designed to accommodate all the different complex systems 
available.  It is the job of the analyst to choose the model that best fit the system under 
investigation.  Depending on the type of risks to be assessed, whether risks at components 
level, human error, human machine interaction or organizational level (Altabbakh et al, 







2.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a bottom up inductive (forward 
approach) risk assessment tool that can be used to identify failure modes that would 
negatively impact the overall system.  FMEA is classified as a DD-HAT type of hazard 
analysis.  It evaluates the effect of these potential failure modes to determine if changes 
are necessary at any stage of the system to overcome such adverse events (Ericson, 
2005).  It is very advantageous to apply FMEA at early stages of the system to increase 
safety since changes, if suggested by FMEA, can be with minimal cost (Dhillon, 1999).  
 On the other hand, FMEA emphasizes on single failure in isolation and it is not 
geared toward multiple failures in combination although some hazards arise from other 
multiple hazards or events and not necessarily mechanical or electrical failure modes 
(Ericson, 2005).  Another drawback is that FMEA does not account for failures that occur 
due to human error in complex systems (Foster, et al., 1999).  In addition, FMEA is 
considered time consuming due to the detailed structure of the analysis.   
 
2.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top down deductive (backward approach) risk 
assessment tool that determines failures and contributing factors of adverse events in a 
system.  FTA is classified as a DS-HAT and DD-HAT hazards analysis type.  Fault trees 
employ graphical diagrams and logic gates to represent the relationship between failures 
and other events in the system and its primary objective is to identify the causal factors of 
a hazard in the system.  Fault trees are based on root cause analysis and they depict the 





of the fact that fault trees requires that analysts study systems under investigation 
thoroughly to eliminate overlooking potential risks factors (Dhillon, 1999), it still lacks 
the ability to capture human error due to the complexity of human behavior that will 
complicate the analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992).  In addition, due to its lengthy 
details nature, fault trees consume time and accumulate size, which makes it hard to form 
into reliability reports. 
 
2.3 Event Tree Analysis 
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a bottom up inductive risk analysis technique that 
identifies and evaluates potential accident and its possible related chain of events 
(Ericson, 2005; Khan & Abbasi, 1998).  ETA is classified as a SD-HAT type of hazard 
analysis.  The analysis starts with an initiating event and goes further in evaluating every 
possible outcome that can results accordingly.  Safety constraints are evaluated in each 
path (accident scenario) whether they are enforced adequately or needs to be addressed in 
order for the selected path to execute smoothly without a failure or an accident.  Event 
trees are easy to learn and apply and they combine human, machine, environment, and 
human interaction (Ericson, 2005).  Unfortunately, event trees only allow one initiating 
event at one time.  Multiple initiating events will have different trees, which will be time 
consuming and trees will be lengthy. 
 





as	  a	  PD-­‐HAT	  and	  the	  DD-­‐HAT	  hazard	  analysis	  type.	   	   It	  starts	  with	  a	  brainstorming	  session	   where	   concerned	   people	   in	   an	   organization	   will	   use	   their	   imagination	   to	  determine	   all	   possible	   scenarios	   where	   hazards	   or	   failure	   might	   occur,	   in	   a	  systematic	   way	   (Kletz,	   1999).	   	   HAZOP	   is	   useful	   to	   apply	   to	   systems	   that	   involve	  human	  performance	  and	  behavior	  or	  any	  system	  that	  involve	  hazards	  that	  are	  hard	  to	   quantify	   or	   detect.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   HAZOP	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	  cognitive ability of human as of why they would commit an unsafe act, which is a 
weakness point of HAZOP.  Thus, HAZOP analysis is not standardized worldwide, 
hence, the analysis is performed differently with variation in results for the same system 
(Pérez-Marín & Rodríguez-Toral, 2013).  Moreover,	  HAZOP	  study	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	   the	   interaction	   between	   different	   component	   in	   a	   system	   or	   a	   process	  (Product	   Quality	   Research	   Institute,	   2013),	   and	   it	   also	   can	   be	   lengthy,	   time	  consuming	  and	  expensive	  (Redmill,	  2002).	  
 
3. System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes - Introduction 
 System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) is a new 
comprehensive accident causation model created by Dr. Nancy Leveson to analyze 
accidents in systems (Leveson, A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems, 
2004).  Leveson suggested that with the evolving changes in technology since WWII and 
the emerging massive complexity of systems components a new approach is needed to 
overcome such pitfalls of traditional accident models.  Rapid speed of technology 





Accordingly the human system integration relationship is becoming more complex.  
 System analysis is useful when analyzing complex accident involving software, 
organization hierarchical and management, human limitations including decision-making 
and cognitive complexity.  Traditional accident causation models lack the ability to 
investigate such complex systems.  Not only can STAMP be used to analyze existent 
accidents, but also it can be utilized to design for a safer system during the system 
development stage to prevent accidents (Leveson, 2003).  STAMP views systems as 
dynamic processes with continuous changes with respect to product/process design, 
management, technologies, workforce and such.  At the design stage, STAMP 
emphasizes enforcing not only safety constraints to the existent design, but also for future 
change and adaptation such as change of technologies, nature of accidents, type and 
nature of hazards, complexity of human system interaction, and safety regulations 
(Leveson, 2004).  
 Most conventional accident causation models view an accident as a result of a 
series of events adapted from the Domino Theory (Hollnagel, 2004), where one event 
leads to the next.  Using this approach, efforts are made by investigators to identify the 
first adverse event in the chain and prevent it from happening without considering 
environmental, organizational, or human contributions.  FMEA, FTA, ETA, and Cause-
Consequence Analysis are based on this approach (Leveson, 1995).  They do not work 
well for complex system involving human behavior because they are based on linear 
chain of events and assume accident is a result of a component failure not accounting for 
accident happening where all components are compromised without failure (Hollnagel, 





once the root cause was identified, the blame tends to be assigned (often to the operator) 
and the analysis stops (Leveson, 2004).  
 The three main principles of STAMP are safety constraints, hierarchical control 
structure, and process models (Leveson, 2012).  First, safety constraints are enforced 
through safety controls, which if adequately implemented will prevent adverse events 
from happening.  An example of safety constraints in the Space Shuttle Challenger would 
be that the temperature should be greater than or equal to 53 degrees in order for the 
shuttle to launch (Kerzner, 2009).  Second, hierarchical control structure represent an 
essential step in applying STAMP where each level of the system contributes to the 
safety or to accidents in a system.  Each level of the hierarchy enforce safety constraints 
to the level below it, and each level below have to give feedback on how these constraint 
are successfully implemented or ineffectively failed.  Consequently, higher levels of 
hierarchy are responsible of the performance of the lower levels through enforcing safety 
constraints.  Missing constraints, inadequate safety control command, commands not 
executed properly at lower level, or inadequate feed back communications about 
constraints are the main reasons of inadequate controls.  Third, four conditions must exist 
for a process to be controlled under STAMP model (Leveson, 2012). Goal (enforcing 
safety constraints in each level of the hierarchy structure by controllers), Action 
Condition (implement actions downward the hierarchy structure), Observatory condition 
(Upward the hierarch), and model condition (the controller’s model of the process being 
controlled), which in our case is the process model.  Essentially, without the latter one, a 





 Unlike traditional accident causation models where the root cause consist of an 
event or chain of events, STAMP focus on investigating the cause of an accident by 
identifying the safety control that were inadequately enforced, or sometimes not enforced 
at all (Leveson, 2012).  Accidents therefore are considered as a result of interactions 
among system components and the lack of control of safety related constraints, no blame 
is pointed to a single component nor blame pointed towards and individual human 
(Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais, 2003).  For example, in the Space Shuttle Challenger 
Disaster, the main cause for the accident was the faulty of the solid rocket booster (SRB) 
o-ring seal.  However, applying system approach risk assessment models revealed more 
contributing factors such as decision makers, line managements, politics, safety 
environment, and ineffective communication (Altabbakh, Murray, Damle, & Grantham, 
2012).  Furthermore, STAMP would continue the analysis with questions such as, why 
did the o-ring fail to adequately control the released propellant gas?  In STAMP, 
accidents are not viewed as failures; instead they represent violation of safety constraints.  
 They can occur when existing safety controls are missing or ineffective. Thus the 
safety of a system is considered a control problem, a control of the safety constraint.  Dr. 
Leveson explains, “Accidents occur when external disturbances, component failures, or 
dysfunctional interactions among system components are not adequately handled by the 
control system (Leveson, 2004).”  
 
3.1 STAMP Analysis 
 Unlike conventional accident causation models, STAMP is not based on chain of 





role in contributing to an accident or attaining successful system safety controls.  Thus 
STAMP prevails conventional accident models by accounting for organizational factors, 
human error, and adaptation to change over time.  In STAMP, system safety is not 
achieved by preventing component failure measures; in fact, it is achieved by enforcing 
safety constraints continuously (Leveson, 2004).  Therefore, accidents do not occur 
because of failure of components, they occur because of ineffective safety constraint 
where main focus is not on how to prevent failure, but on how to design better safety 
controls.  
 STAMP has been utilized to analyze multiple post accidents (Leveson, 2002) 
(Leveson & Laracy, 2007).  Studies showed that utilizing STAMP to analyze accidents 
have revealed more hazards and potential failures in systems than other traditional hazard 
analysis or accident causation models (Song, 2012).  Figure 1 depicts the taxonomy of 
contributory factors in accidents by investigative each component of a control loop and 










Figure 1:  Classification of Control Flaws Leading to Hazards (Leveson, 
2012). 
 
 Causal factors have been divided into three main categories.  The controller 
operation, the behavior of actuators and controlled processes, and communication and 
coordination among controllers and decision makers.  Figure 2 shows the general 
classification of the flaws in the components of the system development and system 
operations control loops during design, development, manufacturing, and operations 





investigation during accident analysis or as an accident prevention to prevent future or 
potential adverse events.  
 1. Inadequate enforcements of constraints (control actions) 
 1.1. Unidentified hazards 
 1.2. Inappropriate, ineffective or missing control actions for identified hazards 
 1.2.1. Design of control algorithm (process) does not enforce constraints 
 —Flaws in creation process 
 —Process changes without appropriate change in control algorithm (asynchronous evolution) 
 —Incorrect modification or adaptation. 
 1.2.2. Process models inconsistent, incomplete or incorrect (lack of linkup) 
 —Flaws in creation process 
 —Flaws in updating process (asynchronous evolution) 
 —Time lags and measurement inaccuracies not accounted for 
 1.2.3. Inadequate coordination among controllers and decision makers 
 2. Inadequate execution of control action 
 2.1. Communication flaw 
 2.2. Inadequate actuator operation 
 2.3. Time lag 
 3. Inadequate or missing feedback 
 3.1. Not provided in system design 
 3.2. Communication flow 
 3.3. Time lag 
 3.4. Inadequate sensor operation (incorrect or no information provided 
Figure 2:  Classification of Control Flaws Leading to Hazards (Leveson, 
2004) 
 
 For each level of the hierarchy, the three main categories should be investigated 
and determine their contribution to the accident (Leveson, 2004): 
• Control actions: inadequate handling of control actions by controllers 






• Feedback: missing or inadequate feedback and communication 
 Another category can be added if humans are involved in the organization being 
investigated, which is the context in which the decision has been made and influenced the 
behavior mechanism (Leveson, 2004).  Figure 3 is an example the structure of STAMP 
analysis for one level of the hierarchy (Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais, 2003). 
 
Figure 3: Accident Causal Factor of Provincial Governments - the 









4. Applying STAMP to an accident in the Oil and Gas Industry 
 XYZ is a major oil company that handles crude oil production operations.  Two 
separate crude oil processing facilities, (A) and (B), collect the crude oil from a 
constellation of near-by wells.  The oil is processed to meet market physical 
characteristics and chemical composition prior to sending it to storage tanks within the 
facility premises.  Industrial export pumps are used to send crude oil via a joint a 30” 
diameter pipeline to central storage tank farm stationed near-by export harbors and then 
shipped to potential customers.  Figure 4 illustrated the layout of the two facilities. 
 During normal operation, and at approximately 9:30 PM, a major accident 
occurred that created massive damage due to explosion at crude oil processing facility B.  
 The accident resulted in fatalities and caused millions of dollars in site damages 
as well as production suspension.  The cause of the accident was due to an oil leak from a 
ruptured export pipeline.  A spark ignited the pool of leaking crude oil, illustrated in 
figure 5, and resulted in series of massive explosion that destructed the entire facility.  In 
addition, the accident resulted in the death of two facility operators and severe injuries to 











Figure 5: Oil leak and in Facility (B) 
 
4.1 The Accident 
 At 3:40 PM, An electrical malfunction occurred in facility (A) resulted in a 







oil export pipeline.  Operators in facility (A) informed area supervisor as well as 
operators in facility (B) to take proper actions in maintaining the pressure until the 
malfunction is rectified.  Operators in facility (B) partially closed the control flow valve 
to maintain, and build up,  the operating pressure in the joint export pipeline.  In parallel, 
the maintenance crew in facility (A) managed to restore the electrical and resume 
production operations; hence, increase the pressure in the joint export crude oil pipeline.  
 Simultaneously, the operators in facility (B) started opening the control flow 
valve back to the original position prior to the shutdown of facility (A).  This task is to 
assist in reducing both the backpressure and the built-up pressure resulting from resuming 
production operations in facility (A).  Unfortunately, the flow control valve did not fully 
open to its original position.  As a result, a backflow generated a build-up pressure in the 
30-inch joint crude oil export pipeline. 
 At 9:30 PM, an over pressure in the pipeline resulted in a pipeline rupture and 
caused a leak of approximately 18,000 barrel of crude oil for over a period of 2 hours.  
Once acknowledged, the operators in Facility (B) immediately pushed Emergency 
Shutdown Button.  This is a part of Emergency ShutDown System (ESD) is designed to 
minimize the consequences of escape of hydrocarbons.   This process consists of 
shutdown of equipment, isolate crude oil by containing it storage tanks, and stop 
hydrocarbon flow to assure maintain the safety and integrity of the facility.  
 Unfortunately, the main flow control valve, which is motor operated, failed to 
fully shutdown and secure the pipeline from flowing any crude oil back in to the facility.  
 Hence, the leak continued to flow from the ruptured pipeline.  The operators in 





in stopping the leak.  Yet, the large amount of leaked crude oil was accumulating nearby 
an electrical generating station.  Since crude oil contains volatile organic fumes and 
vapor, and in an effort to prevent any electrical discharge, electrical maintenance 
contractors in facility (B) disconnected the electrical power supplied to the power-sub-
station.   Simultaneously, the mechanical maintenance crew utilized vacuum trucks to 
collect the spilled crude oil.   This resulted in a static electric discharge and caused series 
of explosions.  The explosions resulted in a total demolition of the facility as well as fires 
that lasted more than 16 hours to extinguish.  In terms of casualties, the explosion 
resulted in the death of four facility operators and severe injuries to 20 contractor 
employees who were at the scene.  
 
4.2 Proximity of events: 
• At 3:40 PM, An electrical malfunction occurred in facility (A)  
• Operators in facility (B) tried close the flow control valve   
• Electrical power restored in facility (A) 
• Production resumed in Facility (A) 
• Operator in Facility (B) opened flow control valve 
• Flow control valve did not open to its original position 
• Backflow generated a build-up pressure in the 30-inch joint crude oil export 
pipeline 
• 30-inch pipeline rupture 





• Operator in Facility (B) pushed emergency shutdown button 
• Suspend all ongoing operations within the facility and close all valves 
• Flow control valve failed to fully shutdown 
• The leak continued to flow from the ruptured pipeline 
• Assistant Operators in facility (B) manually, close the main flow control valve 
• Leak stopped 
• Leaked crude oil was accumulating nearby an electrical generating station 
• Operators in facility (B) disconnected the electrical power supplied to the power 
station 
• Maintenance crew utilized vacuum trucks to collect the spilled crude oil 
• Static electric discharge and caused series of explosions 
• The explosions resulted in a total demolition of the facility 
• Explosion resulted in the death of two facility operators and severe injuries to 20 
contractor employees who were at the scene  
 
4.3 Hierarchical Control Structure 
 Each hierarchical level of the control structure of company XYZ, as depicted in 
figure 6, will be discussed in terms of inadequacy of enforcing safety constraint, 
inadequacy in executing actions, context, and mental flow.  Each box represents a 








Figure 6: Hierarchical Level Control Structure of Company XYZ 
 
Pipeline Mechanical Integrity  
• Oil and gas industry refer to the recommended practices and standards issued by 
the American Petroleum Institute for their activities (Thomas, Thorp, & Denham, 
1992).  The recommended maximum piping inspection interval for crude oil 
pipeline is five years as per the Piping inspection code (API 570).  "Smart Pigs", a 
propelling cylinder-shaped electronic devices inserted into the pipeline, are 
utilized to evaluate the metal loss due to corrosion, cracks, and any other anomaly 
in the pipeline (Kishawy & Gabbar, 2010).  Since the inspection of pipelines 
requires the suspension of production, hence, loss of generated profit, operations, 
Company XYZ recommended all 30-inch pipelines to undergo routine inspections 








Assistant Facility Operators 
• Assistant facility operators conducted a site visit every 4 hours to collect readings 
from various equipment and pressure gauges as part of their routine task.  When 
reaching the main export transfer pump, an assistant facility operator observed 
ruptured pipeline with a pool crude oil leaking.  Immediately, he contacted the 
facility operator via intrinsically safe radio, a standard means of communication 
inside the facility to prevent a spark, to initiate an Emergency ShutDown 
procedure by pushing the ESD located in the control room.  This is an emergency 
standard procedure designed to minimize the consequences of escape of 
hydrocarbons in case of an oil leak.  Consequently, the rest of the assistant facility 
operators started to manually isolate and secure the remaining manually operated 
valves to avoid flow of crude oil through pipelines since not all valves within the 







Facility (B) Operator  
• The facility (B) operator initiated the emergency shutdown (ESD) procedure and 
pushed the (ESD) button located in the control room as per the radio 
communication with the assistant facility operator.  This procedure closes both 
motor and pneumatically operated flow control valves to prevent the flow of 
hydrocarbons.  Accordingly, facility operator contacted the on-call/off-site facility 
(B) supervisor by phone and informed him with the leak as part of the emergency 
response procedure. 
 
Facility (B) Supervisor 
• Facility (B) supervisor contacted the Senior Maintenance engineer by phone  and 





• Facility (B) supervisor contacted the operations superintendent as he was 





Senior Maintenance Engineer 
• Senior maintenance engineer, who is on-call/off-site, contacted the off-site/on-call 
mechanical, electrical, and instrument engineers by phone to contact the off-
site/on-call foremen, who perform the onsite activities with the assistance of 
maintenance contractor, to head to the facility and rectify the leak by using 
pipeline clamps.  These clamps are temporary leak prevention tools secured 
around a pipeline.  
• Senior maintenance engineer contacted by the phone the maintenance 








• The maintenance engineers contacted their off-site/on-call foremen by phone and 
instructed them to deploy the contractor’s mechanical, electrical, and instrument 










• The maintenance foremen (mechanical, electrical, and instrument) contacted the 
off-site/on-call maintenance contractor crew to head to facility (B) which took 
them approximately an hour and a half to reach the facility. 
• Mechanical maintenance crew was successful to stop the leak by clamping the 
ruptured pipeline and using a vacuum tank to gather the leaked crude oil.  
• Electrical/instrument maintenance crew tried isolating the electrical power from 







Operations and Maintenance Manager 
• The manager of production operations and maintenance contacted by phone both 
the emergency response and firefighting team to deploy to facility (B) and assure 
that all leak stopping activities are performed safely.  The power generation 
company is also contacted by the operations and maintenance manager to be 
ready to disconnect the power once requested since power to the facility is 
supplied by the power-generation-company.  In compliance with the emergency 
response procedures, both the team and power generation company were updated 
with the crude oil leak at facility (B). 
• The executive managing director was contacted by phone and updated with the 








 The oil industry utilizes HAZOP risk analysis in its design stages to recognize the 
hazard and operability problems in order to minimize the likelihood and consequences of 
an incident in the facilities (Flin, Mearns, Fleming, & Gordon, 1996).  However, Root-
Cause analysis is considered a fundamental tool to identify causes of accidents within the 
oil industry (Vinnem, Hestad, Kvaløy, & Skogdalen, 2010) as investigators utilized it in 
the case of facility (B) explosion.   This method identified the causes of explosion as 





addition, the method went into further details in recognizing the cause of the leak was due 
to a ruptured 30 inch export pipeline.  Yet, Root-Cause analysis failed to identify any 
procedural and hierarchical gaps negatively influenced decision-making and work 
performance. 	   STAMP analysis revealed several delinquencies in different aspects in Company 
XYZ which if identified in proper time; it would have prevented this catastrophe from 
occurring.  Different levels of the organizational hierarchy contributed to the accident, 
where the main cause of the accident was the spark.   Ineffective safety policy, 
inadequate communication between and within departments, poor supervision, and 
improper allocation of resources are some of the factors that contributed in this tragic 
accident.  Policies and regulations must be implemented in Company XYZ to ensure 
safety to human, equipment, and environment. 
 If the following scenario has been followed, four lives could have been saved and 
financial losses in terms lost production, facility reconstruction, workers compensation, 
environmental impact, and legal claims/fines could have been avoided. In case of an oil 
leak, the assistant facility operators must ensure that all valves are isolated and securely 
shut to prevent the flow of any hydrocarbons through the pipelines.  Thus, gas monitors 
should available with the assistant facility operators to assure that the threshold level of 
evaporating hydrocarbon fumes are within recommended safety limit.  Consequently, 
contact the facility operator to proceed with the emergency shutdown processes to isolate 
all motor and pneumatically operated valves.  The facility operator, after evaluating the 
situation and assuring that all valves are isolated and the facility is safe to perform any 





emergency situation and the emergency procedures that were followed while 
emphasizing that the facility is safe for maintenance staff to proceed with their activity.  
 Concurrently, the facility operator will contact the emergency response and 
firefighting team with details of the situation for them to deploy their equipment and staff 
to supervise the work to be performed by the maintenance staff.  The facility operator 
will contact maintenance engineers (mechanical, electrical, and instrument) who are on-
site as shift-working-type-base and provide details of the emergency situation as they, 
along with the maintenance foremen and maintenance contractors, await for the 
emergency response and firefighting team to ensure the safety of the workplace and give 
them clearance to proceed with the rectification activities.  Meanwhile, the power 
generation company will be notified by the electrical maintenance engineer to be ready 
for emergency power shutdown when instructed.  This procedure will cut the power 
supply for the facility’s power-sub-station.  Both the facility operator and maintenance 
engineer will update both facility operations supervisor and senior maintenance engineer, 
respectively.  Hence, both the facility operations supervisor and the senior maintenance 
engineer will inform both the production operations superintendent and the maintenance 
superintendent who will be in touch with the operations and maintenance manager with 
status update as they assure that all safety procedures are emphasized and followed to 
prevent undesired accidents. 
 All effort from different levels of the hierarchy must collaborate to design a safer 
system in the company.  Policies and procedures should be revised, new regulations must 
be established, implemented to assure that the previous scenario be active and 





complexity of the human mind, machine components, software, environment, and the 
interaction among them. 
6. Conclusion 
 STAMP goes beyond the conventional accident causation methods by pinpointing 
the reasons at human performance and component failure and takes it to another level of 
investigation.  STAMP goes beyond acknowledging these factors and adds organizational 
hierarchy, working practices, and the roles and responsibility of each staff member in the 
organization.  STAMP was simple to apply in the oil industry case study above without 
the need for special analytical skills or expertise, which can be a value added to the 
analysis, to identify the safety violations resulted in the catastrophe.  However, for 
STAMP to be successful, it is essential for the user to have access to some essential 
information.  The organization’s hierarchy can assist in identifying their contribution to 
the safety constraint violation in terms of their influence to their subordinates.  Policies, 
standards, and regulations that shape work practices and how activities are performed is 
key information in detecting improper task execution.  The roles and responsibilities of 
each staff members identify the flow of communication channels used and how decisions 
made and conveyed to the lower hierarchy.  Having this information will build a body of 
knowledge enabling the user to recognize limitations in each safety constraint level and 
where they have been violated in each hierarchical level.   
 STAMP identifies the violations against the existence safety constraints at each 
level of the control structure and investigates why these controls have not been 
adequately enforced or if they were adequately designed originally..   The method 





systems including environment, human error, physical component failure, the context in 
which the accident happen, and the interrelationship between components, machine, 
human and other components of the system.  The model is easy to apply in accident 
investigation and it provides a clear guidance for investigators to conduct the analysis. 
 STAMP has proven that it can be applied to different environment such as 
aerospace systems (Leveson, 2004), U.S. Army friendly fire shootings (Leveson, Allen, 
& Storey, 2002), water contamination accident (Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais, 
2003), aviation (Nelson, 2008) (Hickey, 2012), financial crises (Spencer, 2012), and 
medical industry (Balgos, 2012).  STAMP is a useful holistic model to apply in complex 
system.  Hickey states, compared to other accident causation models, STAMP will reveal 
more causal factors contributing to accidents (Hickey, 2012). 
 Traditional accident analyses are more focused on sequence of events leading to a 
root cause.  Once that root is identified all effort will be applied to eliminate it, which 
does not necessarily eliminate other causes from arising. STAMP in contrast is more 
focused on enforcing safety constraints behavior in systems rather than preventing 
failures.  Accidents are viewed as a result of inadequate safety control.  Moreover, 
STAMP assist in recognizing scenarios, inadequate controls, the dysfunctional 
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 Accidents among young engineers in school’s workshops and labs are relatively 
frequent, among which were severe injuries and tragic fatalities.  Students participate in 
various engineering design competition teams where they spend time in labs and/or 
workshops and other hazardous environment.  Consequently, underestimating the safety 
mindset, which is essential in various phases of any project. These engineers will be part 
of a task force and progress in ranking within the organization and inherit a safety culture 
for the younger engineers to pursue.   In an effort to prevent such accidents and improve 
safety cognition in young engineers, this study examines the training exposure and 
knowledge within engineering competition teams from the students’ perspectives. A 
survey targeting different OSHA safety areas was conducted to measure safety attitudes 
of these young engineers.  The paper, also, explores potential causes that can prevent 










 Young engineers who participate in various design teams spend time in their 
workshops where they encounter different types of hazardous and flammable materials, 
machines, and other hazardous environment.  In addition, other young scientists undergo 
lab experiments as part of their curricular.  However, without the adequate amount and 
utilizing of safety knowledge, these young engineers are vulnerable to avoidable tragic 
accidents.  In the past decade, there have been great concern regarding the frequency of 
academic laboratory accidents occurring across the country, among which were severe 
injuries and deaths.  A graduate student lost three fingers, burned his hands and face, and 
injured one of his eyes at a chemistry lab at Texas Tech university (U.S. Chemical Safety 
and Hazard Investigation Board, 2010).  Another 23 year old female student died of 
second and third degree burns over 43% of her body while doing a research experiment 
in the UCLA lab (Christensen, 2009).  An unfortunate student died of asphyxiation due to 
neck compression when her hair got caught in one of Yale University’s shop’s lathe 
machine  (Henderson, Rosenfeld, & Serna, 2012).  Moreover, Four students from the 
University of Missouri were severely injured during hydrogen explosion in June, 2010 
(U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2010).  There are few examples 
of recent tragic accidents that resulted in injuries, fatalities, and financial losses, not to 
mention school reputation.   
 Such examples of fatal accidents, along with other non-fatal ones, indicate that 
perhaps young college students lack the safety awareness that could prevent such 





 These young engineers are part of future US workforce where employment 
reached 19.5 million young worker (between the age of 16 and 24 years old) in July 2012 
that is 2.1 million increased compared to April 2011 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).  
 During the period of 1998-2007, The U.S. recorded 3.6 deaths per 100,000 young 
workers.  Further more, 7.9 million nonfatal injuries treated in emergency departments 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2010).  In order to identify the lack 
in safety training within students, a survey was conducted to measure safety training, 
knowledge and attitude of these young engineers. 
   
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 Researchers have indicated that young workers are more at risk than their older 
colleges when it comes to work place injuries (Salminen, 2004; McCabe, 2008; Breslin et 
al., 2008). Other study showed that emerging adults prefer activities with higher 
sensation- seeking than adults  (Zuckerman, 1979).  Numerous research have discussed 
the variables that account for such behavior in emerging adults. Immaturity in decision-
making in young adults might be categories to cognitive and psychosocial factors 
(Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996).  Theories have tackled the risk taking behavior in 
emerging adults and adolescents and they all revolve around three essential forms. First, 
biological based on hormonal effects, asynchronous pubertal timing, or generic 
predispositions. Second, psychological or cognitive deficiencies in self-esteem, cognitive 
immaturity, affective disequilibrium, or high sensation seeking. Third, environmental 
causes that focus on social influence related to family and peer interactions, or 





is essential to measure the safety knowledge and attitude of these young engineers and 
identify any safety training deficiencies to prevent undesired outcomes.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 In order to measure safety training, knowledge and attitude of young engineers, a 
survey was constructed based on the Goal Question Metric approach with reference to 
OSHA Guidelines 54 Fed Register #3904-3916. The GQM method required a top down 
methodology in constructing the survey. First, goals need to be specified and focused on.  
 Next, based on these goals, a set of questions is used to measure the information 
needed to accomplish these goals. Finally, metrics are used to quantify the data answered 
in the questions (Basili, Caldiera, & Rombach, 1994). A questionnaire with 24 items 
together with four demographic questions was used to collect the data. The goal of the 
survey as depicted in Table 1, was to determine the amount of training the student have 
on OSHA procedures, his/her knowledge of general safety procedures they think they 
have versus what they actually do, their safety attitude and consciousness. Five questions 
were asked about the amount of training that the young engineers had on personal 
protective equipment (PPE), lockout/tagout, material safety 
data sheets, machine guarding and evacuation in case of an emergency based on OSHA 
guidelines 54 Fed Register #3904-3916. Six questions were asked to test their knowledge 
on OSHA procedures. Five questions were asked to evaluate their attitude toward safety 






Table 1 The Goal Question Metric Survey Model 
Goals Questions Metrics 
Have you been trained to use the personal 
protective equipment (PPE)? 
Have you been trained on how to 
prepare/understand lockout/tagout? 
Have you been trained on using material safety 
data sheet (MSDS)? 







Have you been trained on evacuation from your 
workplace or lab(s) in case of an emergency? 
- No, never 
- Yes, no formal 
training 




In which of the following situations are you 
required to wear safety glasses? (Please check 
all that apply) 
Lockout/tagout is required when. (Please check 
all that apply) 
Locks should always stay on the equipment 
during the shift change? True or false 
When working in a workshop/lab, when do you 
use MSDS (please check all the apply) 








Please check all that applies regarding 
emergency evacuation. 
- Percentage of 
correct 
response 
In situations where safety glasses are required, 
how often do you wear them? 
Do you refer to the MSDS whenever a 





safety attitude How often do you check if machine guards re 







installed on the machine you are about to use? 
In case of an emergency, how often would you 
follow the instructions written for the 
emergency action plan? 
 
If you feel that PPE is not necessary when 













RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 A total of 93 questionnaires were returned including responses that have answered 
some of the survey questions.  68% of the respondents were male, 31% were female, and 
1% preferred not to answer.  The majority of the respondents’ were undergraduate 
students ranging between 32% seniors, 25% juniors, 18% freshman, and 17% sophomore, 
where the others were 3% Alumni and 3% graduate students with 95% of the total 
students majoring in Engineering.  95% of the students were either involved in one or 
more design teams in the present or have been involved in the past and only 5% were 
never involved in any design team. 97% of the students responded positively with regard 
to receiving any types of safety training during college education or job safety training 






Goal one: Evaluate the amount of safety training of Missouri S&T design team 
members 
 When analyzing the students feed back to the amount of safety training they have 
received, it was found that less than 30% of the respondents had any type of formal 
training. This shows that the majority of these young engineers have been working in the 
labs or workshops without the proper training, which makes them vulnerable to make 
unfortunate accidents.   
 
Goal two: Evaluate the student design team members’ safety knowledge 
 The amount of knowledge these young engineers have is insignificant.  Less than 
50% of the students recognized the correct procedures of safety in the workshops and 
labs, which is evidence that their students lack the basic safety procedure knowledge.   
  
Goal three: Evaluate the student design team members’ safety attitude 
 About 30% of the respondents would often follow safety procedures while they 
are in workshops or labs working on their projects. The majority of students would either 
follow the procedures occasionally or only when forced to.   
 
Goal four: Evaluate the student design team members’ safety consciousness 
 The respondents were requested to evaluate their self-consciousness toward 
overall safety; one can predict the response reading the analysis above. 58% of the 
respondents find themselves as safety conscious when self-asses themselves, 25% find 






 There are some remarkable findings that were attained from this survey.  Most of 
the findings show that young engineers have been receiving informal training. Informal 
safety training are often ineffective and does not always assure positive safety attitude or 
safety performance, it actually can lead to death, injury, pain and economic loss (Whiles, 
1999).  Training should be conducted through educational institutes rather than randomly 
selected organization with informal training that is based on general knowledge (Fanning, 
2012; Robotham, 2001; Cekada, 2011).  In order to reap the fruits of safety culture, it is 
essential to implement such culture for novice engineers in their college education.  It is 
noticed that serious chemical or laboratory incidents are often thought to be the result of a 
weak or deficient safety culture; a principal root cause of the incident (Committee on 
Chemical Safety, 2012).  A strong safety culture is required to protect employees but is 
especially important in protecting students and in developing students’ skills and 
awareness of safety.   Thus, students will acquire the skills to recognize hazards, to assess 
the risk of exposures to those hazards, to minimize the risk of exposures to hazards, and 
to be prepared to respond to laboratory emergencies  (Committee on Chemical Safety, 
2012).   
 The findings of this survey showed that the respondents’ knowledge of five 
domains of the OSHA guidelines was inadequate specifically with regards to PPE, 
LOTO, MSDS, Machine guarding, and Emergency action plan.  Consequently, it 
reflected on their attitude toward the risk that might come from their areas of 
occupational safety and health. For young engineers and scientist in the work force, the 





positions.  (Allen & Katz, 1986).  Engineers with high-potentials rapidly rise within their 
organizations to positions of great distinction and leadership and they are competent in 
transforming their acquired educational knowledge and skills into successful 
entrepreneurial ventures (Hissey, 2000).  Those young engineers are the future managers 
of the organizations. Thus, training them at younger age would shape their safety attitude 
positively to be inherited within the organization once they rank higher.  Managers and 
supervisors play an essential role in creating a safety climate within the organization the 
safety culture that the managers and supervisors create within the organization have a 
great impact perceptions of safety climate, which in return will influence the employees’ 
safety performance (Thompson, Hilton, & Witt, 1998).  Safety is a positive value – it 
prevents injuries, saves lives, and improves productivity and outcomes. When safety is 
actively practiced, and is regarded as a critical core value by organizational leaders, it 
bestows a sense of confidence and caring in all working there (Committee on Chemical 
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 The different risk management models utilized in the case studies showed their 
competency in identifying potential risks of the system’s lifecycle. FMEA, FTA, and 
RED address risks at the component and sub-system level, the Swiss Cheese Model focus 
on risks related to human system interaction.  Moreover, LOPA contemplate the system 
in its entirety and designs defense layers to protect the system from an adverse outcome.  
 Finally, STAMP is a holistic model that identifies the reason why those safety 
constraints in place were not effective in the first place. 
 The phase of risk identification dictates the different risk management models 
discussed in the paper.  For example, FMEA, with its capability in identifying failure 
modes, is suitable in the preliminary design phase to prevent such failures by taking the 
necessary cautiousness based on occurrence/severity ratings.   RED can identify potential 
failures of a product, as early as the conceptual phase, throughout the historical database 
imbedded in the software.  This is advantageous as RED can minimize any decision 
making preconceptions.  FTA considers all potential causes resulting in undesired 
consequences.  All these causes can be evaluated to assure the stability of the system 
where engineering managers lead these evaluation sessions.  However, and regardless of 
their potential in risk identification, both FTA and FMEA are time and recourses 





 The Swiss Cheese Model is beneficial when human system interaction is involved 
in identifying risks.  The model constructs defensive layers in the system and focuses on 
human errors and human factors when assessing risk. The model suggest that in order for 
an accident to occur all the safeguards in the system have to be breached with a trajectory 
that passes through all the holes, which includes unsafe acts and latent conditions.  Thus, 
Swiss Cheese Model will not be applicable if one of the defensive layers is missing. 
 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) utilizes the known risk to construct 
defensive layers to protect the designated system.  LOPA is a scenario-based approach, 
which allows the managers to address probable mitigation tools to reduce undesired 
consequences, including both human and organizational factors, which makes it unique 
among other models.  Yet, LOPA is project specific, which requires past knowledge and 
experience since it not generic to all systems.   
 System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes recognizes the violation against 
the existence safety constraints at each level of the hierarchy of any system.  The model 
main concern is why these safety controls were not effectively enforced if they have 
adequately been designed at the first place.  However, in order to utilize this model, 
system hierarchy of the accident and accident report must be available for investigators to 
successfully apply the model. 
 There is no risk assessment model that is able to identify all potential risks. 
Engineering managers need to address and weigh their options when deciding which 
method is appropriate for the project. Industry type, product/lifecycle phase, scheduling, 
available recourses, and risk level identifications are important factors to consider in 





core component level.  Swiss Cheese Model and/or LOPA can trigger human errors and 
organizational shortcomings.  However, LOPA and STAMP is a beneficial technique to 
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